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Abstract. The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of corporate 
governance (CG) implementation on related party transactions (RPT), 
proxied by debt and receivables, in Indonesian banks. This study utilizes a 
multiple regression approach to analyze it. The results depict that CG did not 
affect both debt and receivables from bank-related parties. Those results 
suggest that albeit the government and company implement CG on 
Indonesian banking, it did not provide benefits to alleviate RPT, where RPT 
itself leads to bringing more drawbacks for the company. Therefore, it is 
pivotal to improve CG in Indonesia due to the low CG score. 
Keywords: related party transactions (RPT), corporate governance 
(CG), bank, Indonesia 
Abstrak. Studi ini bertujuan untuk menguji dampak dari implementasi tata 
kelola perusahaan (CG) terhadap transaksi dengan pihak terkait/related 
party transactions (RPT), yang diproksikan dengan hutang dan piutang, 
pada bank-bank di Indonesia. Studi ini menggunakan pendekatan regresi 
berganda untuk menganalisisnya. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa CG tidak 
berpengaruh terhadap hutang dan piutang dengan pihak bank terkait. Hasil 
tersebut menunjukkan bahwa meskipun pemerintah dan perusahaan 
mengimplementasikan CG pada perbankan Indonesia, CG tidak memberikan 
manfaat untuk mengurangi RPT, di mana RPT sendiri lebih memicu kerugian 
perusahaan. Sehingga, penting untuk meningkatkan CG di Indonesia karena 










The Corporate Governance (CG) implementation becomes considerable pivotal 
for any company, after the disclosure scandals from big companies, e.g., Enron 
in 2001, WorldCom, and Tyco in 2002. In Indonesia, the issue related to CG is 
very crucial, as evidence by the establishment of the National Committee on 
Governance Policy in 1999. The CG definition base on the Forum for Corporate 
Governance in Indonesia (FCGI) is a set of rules that regulates the relationship 
between shareholders, administrators, creditors, government, employees, and 
other both internal and external stakeholders. In other words, a system that 
directs and controls the company. The goal of CG implementation is to create 
added value for all stakeholders and to realize the Good Corporate Governance 
(GCG) for the Indonesian company. 
The prior studies on CG have been conducted in various ways, such as Kaihatu 
(2006) and Wibowo (2010), about Good Corporate Governance (GCG) and its 
application in Indonesia. Those studies find that the implementation of GCG in 
Indonesia was still weak, and 69.3% of Indonesia banks did not comply with 
GCG reporting due to various reasons. Indonesian Institute for Corporate 
Directorship (IICD) also finds that the implementation of GCG in Southeast Asia 
in 2013, where Indonesia has a CG score by 54.55 (Yunus, 2016). From those 
studies, it could be seen that the CG implementation in Indonesia is not 
adequate. 
The disclosure case of the Ratu Harbor, a branch of West Java Bank (Bank Jawa 
Barat Banten/BJB) in 2015 related to misappropriation of loan funds to the 
members of the Putra Daerah Cooperation as the employees of PT. Haekal Adeel 
Utama could be proof of weak CG. The chairman of Putra Daerah Cooperation 
and Managing Director of PT. Haekal Adeel Utama was made defendants along 
with the other three defendants. In this case, there were also a lot of fictitious 
matters related to requirements of credit application, including unfit 
procedures, employee salaries mark-up, and procurement of fictitious 
employees. Also, there was no evidence that all employees of PT. Haekal Adeel 
Utama was registered as the Employment Social Security (JAMSOSTEK) 
participants; so, the validity of their business was questioned (Supriadi, 2015). 
Besides, there was also the Bank Mandiri case in 2016, which carried out loans 
to PT. Central Stell Indonesia (CSI). In this case, the bank management and PT 
CSI were suspected of cooperating, so the loan is carried out and ultimately 
detrimental to Bank Mandiri since the credit is not by its procedure. Finally, the 
credit was stalled (Antara, 2017). 
Those two cases proved that even though a bank is a highly regulated company, 
nonetheless the problems related to CG are still found associated with its 
application in the banking business activities. The case occurred due to the 
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abuse of authority related to the selection and submission of credit 
requirements for transactions on related parties or often referred to as Related 
Party Transactions (RPT). RPT is an agreement or business arrangement 
carried out by parties that are dependent on each other for specific purposes. 
Indeed, in its implementation, transactions on related parties can not only 
contribute benefits to the company in many aspects but also cause a conflict of 
interest. The argument is aligned with Pozzoli & Venuti (2014), who found that 
higher RPT could be a source of calamity for the company. The RPT is a moral 
hazard since certain parties use it as a mechanism to exploit the asset's 
company. Therefore, the shareholders are abused, and the company is also 
damaged. Besides, Claessens, et al., (1999) stated that RPT could also lead to 
financial losses for the company. It is a process of using the right to control a 
person to maximize one's welfare or certain groups by distributing wealth from 
the other parties. 
The RPT can occur in the companies entailing banks. In banking, RPT is 
reflected through every activity related to debt and receivables carried out by 
banks. It is completed to fulfill the company's objectives and so that 
transactions can be efficient. Still, at this point, there is possible agency conflict 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) between the principal (shareholders with related 
party) and agent (bank manager). It could be used as a tool for certain parties 
to fulfill their personal goals and ignore the company's main objectives. It is 
detrimental for the company to include credit, as the application of investments 
in related parties, and fund receipt from customers for deposits that are not 
under the bank's standard procedures. 
A CG is required to solve agency conflict when it occurs. The disclosure in 
financial statements indicates an example of CG implementations. The 
disclosure detail is presented in the financial statement notes. Those notes 
include the explanation of various accounts on the balance sheet, including 
related to accounts with associated parties. When the disclosures are presented 
adequately, it will introduce the origin and process of RPT. Accordingly, it could 
reduce RPT that could be the source of financial losses. Thus, fulfilling 
disclosure is the best strategy to enhance company value and then to maximize 
stakeholder's wealth. 
This study offers some improvements from the limitations of the previous 
research. For instance, Lo et al., (2010) suggest that corporate governance is 
essential in deterring the use of manipulated transfer prices in related-party 
sales transactions. They also note that the corporate governance mechanism 
could be less effective in curbing earnings manipulations via related-party 
transactions due to different manipulation incentives. The limitations of this 
study are from China and for just one year. Choi et al., (2014) the effect of 
corporate governance in emerging markets could be weak, so its benefit could 
be insignificant. Korea is a developed country, but that has strong business 
affiliation groups, called “Chaebol”, that can reduce CG effect. In comparison, 
Sulong & Ahmed (2011) find a negative relationship between CG and RPT on 
Malaysian listed firms because it restricts the controlling shareholders to vote 
on related party transactions. Next, Roy (2015)  found that CG helps to reduce 
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RPT in India by promoting transaction monitoring. Both Sulong & Ahmed 
(2011) and Roy (2015) focused on industrial firms only excluding bank.  
Therefore, in this study, we try to improve those limitations by entailing all 
Indonesian commercial banks over the period 2013 to 2015, focusing on RPT 
as the dependent variable. This study also focuses on Indonesian banks to 
provide empirical evidence of CG implementation on Related Party Transaction 
with a unique setting in an emerging market to obtain understanding genuinely. 
This research was conducted due to some reasons: First, the phenomenon that 
Indonesia implements CG for banking. Utama & Musa (2011) reports that Bank 
Indonesia Decree No. 8/4/PBI/2006 requires the banking sector to 
communicate their corporate governance practices in the form of a self-
assessment working paper GCG. Second, even though CG has been implemented 
for Indonesian banks, the existence of RPT and credit fraud involved bank 
management still happens. The weak governance is one of the factors that 
causes bank fraud in Indonesia. By those factors and prior studies, this research 
is hopefully would be useful for both policymakers and banks. First, Indonesian 
Central Bank as an input to regulate CG in the banking sector to alleviate RPT in 
Indonesia; second, for commercial banks to improve the CG implementation. 
Literature Review 
Agency theory 
Agency theory, firstly proposed Jensen & Meckling (1976), could be applied to 
explain the corporate governance phenomenon in this research. It concerns 
contractual relationships among the company's members. It also revealed that 
agency relationship occurs when a person or more (shareholders as principal) 
appoints another person (manager as agent) to provide a service and delegate 
decision-making authority. It would lead to agency conflict when the principal 
acts as its own, not to maximize shareholder wealth. The agency conflict occurs 
when there is a separation between ownership and control. 
An understanding of agency theory is pivotal since its implementation is used 
to overcome agency problems. Those problems could arise from various parts 
of the company. In this study with banking context, debt, and receivable 
accounts are the core of bank business. The problem could happen, as an 
example, when determining credit will be given by the bank. As an agent, the 
bank manager should approve the loan that benefits to shareholders 
(principal). But, when the shareholders have conflicts of interest to certain 
parties, they still ask the manager to approve loans even though it would be 
losses to the banks. 
Nevertheless, it is also possible for the bank manager to take the opportunity to 
benefit its own or group, as shown in the case of determining credit at BJB and 
Mandiri banks. Transactions from related parties in debt and receivables 
account can be part of the agency problem. The good corporate governance 
(GCG) application hopefully could solve that problem. When corporate 
governance is running-well, that problem could be minimized. According to 
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Naufa & Lantara, (2018) the corporate governance could help to solve that 
agency conflict since it makes the manager act following the company's goal. 
Besides, good corporate governance could improve the company's value. Moin 
et al., (2019) added that corporate governance helps to measure a conflict of 
interest between controlling and minority shareholders through monitoring 
the manager.  
Corporate governance in banking 
According to the Cadbury (1992), corporate governance (CG) is a system 
concerning how companies are directed and controlled. The Forum for 
Corporate Governance in Indonesia (2000) suggested that CG is a set of rules 
that define the relationship between internal and external parties of the 
company related to their rights and obligations. While Warsono, Darmawan, & 
Ridha (2009) stated that the phrase of CG consists of two words; corporate, 
indicating various traits related to corporation or company and governance, 
which means the management. Hayati & Gusnardi (2012) said that CG is a 
concept that, based on agency theory, is expected as a tool to provide confidence 
for investors to receive returns from their investment in the future. The 
Indonesian Institute for Corporate Governance (2000) defines good corporate 
governance (GCG) as a set of rules that regulates the relationship between 
shareholders, company managers, creditors, governments, employees, and 
other internal-external stakeholders. Those relationships are related to rights 
and obligations or, in other words, a system that regulates and controls the 
company. 
The purpose of CG implementation in banks is to achieve sound corporate 
governance (GCG). KNKCG (2004) suggested that the application of GCG in 
banks must be considered because bank characteristics are highly regulated. 
Hence, they are different from other types of companies. Good banking 
governance includes resource and risk management to be more effective and 
efficient. It is essential to enhance the discipline and responsibility of corporate 
members and to increase the company's contribution to the economy. GCG, in 
its implementation, is also found in banks as stipulated in PBI No. 
8/4/PBI/2006. This regulation outlines five principles that become the GCG 
basis on banks as follows: 1). Transparency, openness in expressing material 
and relevant information, and openness in carrying out the decision-making 
process. 2). Accountability, function, and implementation clarity of bank 
accountability, so the management would run effectively. 3). Responsibility, the 
suitability of bank management with applicable laws and regulations, and the 
principles of bank management soundness. 4). Independence, bank 
management in a professional manner without any influence or pressure from 
any party. 5). Fairness, equality in fulfilling the stakeholder rights that arise 
based on agreements, applicable laws, and regulations. 
Related party transaction 
Related party transactions (RPT) are the transactions from agreements 
between the two parties related to a particular contract. RPT is carried out as 
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an objective to fulfill the company interests through exclusive agreements. 
According to PSAK No. 7 in 2015, related parties are if a party can control 
another party or has a significant influence on the other party to make financial 
and operational decisions. The related party's selection must be made following 
the management of each company, so there is no abuse. The RPT is transactions 
carried out by 1). companies with ownership relationship, 2). individuals as 
owners or employees with significant influence, 3). the closest family member 
of the individual, and 4). companies with substantially own from these 
individuals. 
The regulation referred to International Accounting Standards (International 
Accounting Standard) No. 24 and stated in the Indonesian Banking Accounting 
Guidelines (PAPI). The RPT has two opposing hypotheses, opportunistic and 
efficient transactions (Choi et al., 2014). The opportunistic deal due to conflict 
of interest is consistent with agency theory. RPT is expressed as an opportunist 
activity. Choi et al., (2014) stated that RPT would ultimately destroy the 
company's value. An opportunistic transaction in RPT is carried out to fulfill 
personal benefits without thinking about the company's goals. In contrast, an 
efficient transaction is when it carried out efficiency consideration to meet the 
company's needs. When RPT is opportunistic, the agency problems will occur. 
This problem could be solved by GCG implementation. So, an understanding of 
the relationship between two parties (agency relationship) is essential in the 
GCG application. 
The impact of CG implementation on the RPT level  
The accurate and fair financial statements determine GCG implementation in 
the company. The accurate means carefully presented in each part, while fair 
implies following the actual situation. The financial statements are 
accountability proof of every party in the company, both internal and external. 
It will be used as guidelines for various stakeholders to make investments, 
assess the company's health, and determine how the actions to achieve the 
company's goals in the future. The company's goals will not be achieved if there 
are many obstacles in various from the company. One of them is unfair financial 
statements. It could be caused by multiple items, one of which is a fraud.  
In bank business, fraud could happen linked to debt and receivable accounts 
with related parties. This account exists due to RPT, such as a family 
relationship or a subsidiary. Policies for those accounts have their procedures 
and are prone to be misused by bank management to fulfill personal or group 
needs. In this case, CG implementation is used as a tool to suppress fraud 
through RPT, thereby reducing activities that can decrease the company's value. 
The application of the CG role is divided into five principles in banking. First, 
openness to present material and relevant information in the decision-making 
process. Once banks have implemented proper disclosure on their financial 
statements, detailed information on the accounts would be seen. The presented 
information contains how processes in accounts occur. The information details 
could be seen in financial statement items issued by the bank. When data has 
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been presented openly, the stakeholders could monitor any related party 
transactions.  
Second, accountability is the clarity function. When banks have a proper level 
of responsibility, the clarity of the accountability function of each bank body 
will run effectively. The bank management will make decisions related to the 
RPT properly, so it runs under the company objectives and stakeholders' 
interests.  
Third, responsibility is suitable for bank management according to laws, 
regulations, and bank principles. Conducting RPT avoidance will reduce the 
occurrence of RPT, which is unmatched with bank qualifications and 
procedures.  
Fourth, bank management is independent of any influence or pressure. The 
bank management has separate functions to make decisions regarding the right 
procedures with no RPTs; it will process without any intervention from various 
parties that are not in line with bank objectives.  
Fifth, fairness is justice and equality to fulfill stakeholders the rights from the 
agreements, applicable laws, and regulations. Fairness occurs when each 
stakeholder upholds the equality principle. In this case, the related party would 
obtain its share without disrupting other stakeholder rights. The rights can be 
in the form of loans with lower interest rates, longer-term investments, and so 
on. 
When those five principles work well means that the implementation of CG is 
also proper. Proper CG implies that companies do not conduct business 
activities that are profitable for certain groups, only RPT; therefore, the number 
of related party transactions will decrease. The decrease is better because if a 
deal with a relevant party has a large amount, it could create an opportunity for 
management to commit fraud, namely opportunistic earnings management. 
The fraud could be carried out by the company's management through related 
party transactions for a particular person or group interests. For instance, when 
a company plans to avoid high taxes on profit by reducing profits through 
transfers between periods or between transactions with related parties. Once 
it is completed, the deals would only benefit specific groups and ignore the 
company's goals. 
Self-assessment scores reported by the company measure CG assessments. The 
lower the CG score indicated, the better the implementation of CG. This 
statement is in line with the study by Kohlberck & Mayhew (2004) which stated 
that the possibility of the existence of RPT would be even more significant when 
corporate governance is weak. Therefore, the hypotheses proposed in this 
study are as follows: 
H1a: The implementation of corporate governance hurts the level of related 
party transactions in terms of debt on commercial banks. 
H1b: The implementation of corporate governance hurts the level of related 










Figure 1 Hypothesis model 
Research Method 
Population and sample 
The population in this study were all Commercial Banks in Indonesia registered 
at Central Bank of Indonesia between 2013 and 2015. Sampling in this study 
was conducted using a purposive sampling method with the following criteria: 
(1) having a self-assessment score data in the GCG report during 2013-2015 (2) 
having a debt and receivables ratio score data with related parties. 
Table 1. Sampling 
Criteria Total 
Banks listed on IDX in 2013–2015 
Banks did not publish the RPT score on financial statements (2013-2015) 




Total Sample Used 70 
Based on Table 1, the number of companies used in this study is 70 companies 
or 210 firm-year data. The secondary data was collected from the IDX website 
(www.idx.co.id) and the bank's website regarding the disclosure of Good 
Corporate Governance. 
Variable measurement 
The dependent variable of this study is the level of related party transactions 
measured by the ratio of related party receivables compared to total assets and 
the number of related party debts compared to total liabilities. According to 
Pozzoli & Venuti (2014), increasing the number of RPT could be a bad thing for 
the company. The higher the number of RPTs, the greater the possibility of 
fraud. The independent variable of this research is the implementation of 
corporate governance, which is measured using a self-assessment score on the 
GCG report. 
The control variable of this study is the firm size. According to Putri & Nasir 
(2006), the firm size can be measured by total assets. The higher the firm's 
assets, the greater the size of the firm. The higher the firm’s assets allow the 
greater value of the fraud. The fraud can be in the form of determining related 







inappropriate credit requirements. Even though the company has an excellent 
internal control system, nevertheless, when there is an opportunity, 
opportunistic management will take the opportunity to gain personal 
advantage. It causes the failure of Good Corporate Governance.  
The measurement of variables and scales in this study are presented in Table 2 
below: 
Table 2. The Measurement and Scale of Research Variables 
Variables Measurement Scale 
X = Corporate Governance 
 
Measured by a self-assessment score 
on the corporate governance report 
for the period 2013-2015 
Ratio 
Y = Related Party Transaction 
 
 
Measured by the ratio of debt to 
related party debt 
Measured by the ratio of receivables to 
related party receivables 
Ratio 
Control = Firm Size Measured by Natural Logarithm (ln) of 
total assets 
Ratio 
Analysis techniques and steps 
The analysis technique in this study is multiple linear regression with the 
following equation: 
For debt with related parties 
RPTu = α + β1GCG + β2UP + ɛ (1) 
Notes: 
RPTu = total debt to related parties; α = constant; β1GCG = the level of 
implementation of good corporate governance; β2UP = firm size; ɛ = error 
For receivables with related parties 
RPTp = α + β1GCG + β2UP + ɛ (2) 
Notes: 
RPTp = total receivables from related parties; α = constant; β1GCG = the level of 
implementation of good corporate governance; β2UP = firm size; ɛ = error 
Furthermore, the steps of the analysis are as follows:  
1. Descriptive statistics testing 
This test is carried out to get a description or description of data that is seen 
from the mean, standard deviation, variance, minimum, sum, the range of 
kurtosis, and skewness. 
2. Classical assumptions testing 
A multicollinearity test, according to Ghozali (2006) is conducted to test 
whether the regression model found a correlation between independent 
variables. A multicollinearity test is done by looking at the value of the variance 
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inflation factor (VIF). If the VIF value is more than 10, there will be 
multicollinearity. Conversely, if the VIF value is below 10, then this does not 
occur. 
A normality test is held to test whether, in the regression model, the 
confounding or residual variables have a normal distribution. It is known that 
the t and F tests assume that the residual value follows a normal distribution. 
The Heteroskedasticity test is conducted to determine whether the regression 
model is feasible to predict the dependent variable influenced by the 
independent variable using the Glejser test. 
3. Hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis testing in this study was carried out using multiple linear regression 
analysis, as described in the previous section. 
Research Results And Discussion 
Descriptive statistics analysis 
 Table 3 shows descriptive statistics that include mean, minimum value, 
maximum value, and standard deviation of the study variables. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Source: Output from SPSS version 20 
Based on Table 3, the CG self-assessment score has a minimum value of 1.00 
and a maximum of 4.00, with an average of 1.89. The average value depicts that 
the level of RPT debt is low since it is worth less than 2.5, according to Bank 
Indonesia regulations. Furthermore, Table 4 shows the CG composite values, 
which indicate the final rating of the self-assessment. 
 
Table 4. Rating Classification of Composite Value of CG 
Implementation 
No Composite Value Composite Predicate 
1 Composite Value < 1.5 Very good 
2 1.5 ≤ Composite Value < 2.5 Good 
3 2.5 ≤ Composite Value < 3.5 Good enough 
4 3.5 ≤ Composite Value < 4.5 Less good 
5 4.5 ≤ Composite Value < 5 Not good 
Source: SE of Bank Indonesia No. 9/12/DPNP about the implementation of Good 
Corporate Governance of General Bank and attachment 
 N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean SD 
Score of self-assessment 210 1.00 4.00 398.85 1.89 0.52 
RPT debt 210 0.00 0.51 19.06 0.09 0.10 
RPT receivables 210 0.00 0.41 5.28 0.02 0.05 
Ln of firm size 210 10.50 20.63 3,453.43 16.44 1.98 
Valid N (listwise) 210      
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The ratio of RPT debt has a minimum value of 0.00 and a maximum value of 
0.51, with an average of 0.09. The average value is good because the value is 
lower than the mean value (0.09 <0.25). The ratio of RPT receivables has a 
minimum value of 0.00 and a maximum value of 0.41, with an average of 0.02. 
The average value shows that the level of RPT of receivables is low since the 
value is lower than the mean value (0.02<0.20). The control variable in this 
study is the firm size, which is assessed by the natural logarithm (ln) of the 
assets. Natural logarithms (ln) are used to obtain data normality. The Ln of firm 
size has a minimum value of 10.50 and a maximum value of 20.63, with an 
average of 16.44. The average value of the company size is significant, as it is 
higher than the average value (16.44>15.56). The independent variable, CG 
self-assessment scores, and control variable, firm size show good data quality 
because, according to Ghozali (2006), the higher average value than the 
standard deviation indicates a small error standard of the variable under study. 
Table 5 illustrates the comparison between CG scores and RPT from the ten 
highest banks that have good CG scores (CG ≤ 2) and high RPT. 
 
Table 5. Comparison of CG Score and RPT of the 10 Highest Banks  
No  Bank ID Bank Name 






1 122 PT. BPD KALIMANTAN SELATAN 2.00 0.40 0.30 
2 501 PT. BANK ROYAL INDONESIA 1.50 0.40 0.03 
3 111 PT. BANK DKI 1.53 0.23 0.003 
4 564 PT. BANK MANDIRI TASPEN POS 
D/H PT. BANK SINAR HARAPAN 
BALI 
1.50 0.23 0.004 
5 153 PT. BANK SINAR MAS 1.60 0.19 0.03 
6 8 PT. BANK MANDIRI (PERSERO), Tbk 1.60 0.09 0.18 
7 2 PT. BANK RAKYAT INDONESIA 
(PERSERO), Tbk 
1.14 0.13 0.10 
8 422 PT. BANK BRI SYARIAH d/h DJASA 
ARTHA 
1.70 0.13 0.05 
9 11 PT. BANK DANAMON INDONESIA, 
Tbk 
1.40 0.13 0.04 
10 16 PT. BANK BUMI ARTA 1.50 0.01 0.001 
Classical assumption testing 
Table 6 below summarizes the classical assumption test. It includes the 
normality test, multicollinearity test, and heteroskedasticity test. We did not 
test the autocorrelation test since it is not an issue of this study (due to low 
standard errors). 
 





(Constant)   -0.05 0.95 
CG 0.97 1.02 0.80 0.42 
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UP 0.97 1.02 1.67 0.09 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) = 0.75 
Source: Data computed in 2017 
Based on Table 6, the results of the normality test using the one-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test show asymptotic value significance of 0.75, which 
indicates that the data is normal. The tolerance value is > 0.10 or VIF value < 
10.00. The significant value is more than 0.05. It indicates that the data are free 
from multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. 
Hypothesis testing 
Table 7 summarizes the hypothesis test, which includes the R-square test, t-test, 
and F-test. 
 
Table 7. Summary of Hypothesis 1a Testing Results  
Variable Coefficient t Sig 
(Constant) 0.33 0.26 0.79 
CG 0.06 0.32 0.74 
UP -0.64 -1.47 0.14 
R2 = 0.012;   F = 0.296;   Sig.(F) = 0.587b 
Source: Data computed in 2017 
Based on Table 7, the value of R-square is 0.012, which means that corporate 
governance affects debt with related parties of 1.2%, and other variables 
influence the rest. The significance of the F-value is higher than 0.05 
(0.58>0.05), which indicates that the proposed hypothesis is not supported. 
These results suggest that simultaneous corporate governance does not 
significantly affect debt with related parties. The t value of the CG variable is 
smaller than the value of t-table (0.32<1.99), and the significance value is 
greater than 0.05 (0.14>0.05); accordingly, that hypothesis 1a is rejected. The t 
value of the control variable, i.e., the firm size of the company, is smaller than t-
table (-1.44<1.99), and the significance value is higher than 0.05 (0.14> 0.05). 
Thus, the firm size does not significantly influence the debt to related parties. 
 
Table 8. Summary of Hypothesis 1b Testing Results  
Variable Coefficient t Sig 
(Constant) -2.683 -1.845 0.067 
CG -0.277 -1.146 0.253 
UP -0.243 0.477 0.634 
R2 = 0.008;   F = 1.520;   Sig.(F) = 0.219b 
Source: Data computed in 2017 
Based on Table 8, the value of R-square is 0.008, which indicates that corporate 
governance affects receivables with related parties by 0.8%, and other 
variables outside of this study influence the rest. The significance value is 
higher than 0.05 (0.21>0.05), which means that the proposed hypothesis is not 
supported. These results indicate that simultaneous corporate governance does 
not significantly affect receivables with related parties. The t-value of the CG 
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variable is smaller than the value of t-table (-1.14 <1.99), and the significance 
value is higher than 0.05 (0.25> 0.05); as a result, the hypothesis 1b is rejected. 
The t-test for the control variable, namely firm size, indicates that the t-value is 
smaller than the t-table (0.47 <1.99), and the significance value is higher than 
0.05 (0.63> 0.05). Thus, the firm size does not significantly affect the receivable 
to related parties. 
Discussions 
Effect of corporate governance on related party transaction on 
commercial banks 
Based on the results of hypothesis testing, corporate governance does not affect 
a similar party transaction. The hypotheses are not supported because several 
banks have implemented SOPs related to the RPT practice, but they have a low 
CG Score. However, many Indonesian banks still did not apply this procedure to 
alleviate RPT. For the banks who have implemented CG (SOP) to reduce RPT, 
we still find insignificant results that could tackle the RPT issue. Moreover, for 
those banks who did not implement it, we argue that the RPT issue could be 
worse. It is proven by the implementation of ISO (International Organization 
for Standardization) in several banks such as Bank Indonesia, BCA, BNI, BRI, 
and Bank Mandiri. The application of ISO includes ISO 27001 regarding the 
security and disclosure of transaction information to interested parties. When 
it is done well, the implementation of the RPT is not carried out in the interests 
of certain parties, but rather for all stakeholders to achieve company objectives. 
The results of this study are also supported by data showing that some 
companies have good CG composite values as well as high RPT values compared 
to the average. 
Conclusion 
Based on the results and discussion described above, this study concludes that 
corporate governance (CG) does not significantly affect debt and receivables 
(related party transactions/RPT) in the banking sector due to a lower score of 
CG for Indonesian banks.  It is pivotal to improve CG, so it hopefully would 
alleviate the RPT issue and lead to a bank's improvement in Indonesia. 
We were aware that our study still has some limitations, such as first, the 
subjectivity of CG Self-Assessment composite score measurement because the 
assessment is carried out by the company itself. Second, the use of short-term 
data, from 2013 to 2015, does not represent CG practice in the long run. Third, 
the measurement of related party transactions is only based on the amount 
value so that the analysis is less comprehensive. Other measures should be 
added, such as the annual growth of RPT and the amount of RPT fraud. 
Based on this study, the Central Bank of Indonesia should provide clear rules 
regarding the implementation of the RPT by setting a maximum amount of RPT 
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for the banks to minimize the opportunity for bank management, who wants to 
utilize the RPT to meet the interests of related parties.  
Commercial banks should disclose the details of the RPT in the notes to the 
financial statements by adding explanations of the RPT being implemented and 
the reasons for choosing a certain party or company in the implementation of 
the RPT. 
Further studies are expected to explore more details of the corporate 
governance composite score to get a more comprehensive analysis. Self-
assessment can be sectionally calculated based on shareholder rights, GCG 
policies, GCG practices, disclosures, and audits to obtain more accurate results. 
Future studies could improve the calculation of the increase or decrease the 
ratio of the percentage of related party transactions, and to explore other types 
of banks such as Bank of Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR) and categorize them to get 
more specific results. 
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